It’s been a quiet weekend on the news front. Taking advantage of the quiet I have finally set myself to reading Neustadt and Fineberg’s The Swine Flu Affair: Decision-Making on a Slippery Disease, available free in pdf.
I also devoted some of my available free time to a review of what is, in my opinion, a seminal offering on intellectual property, Kinsella’s Against Intellectual Property, available free in pdf. Regular readers will probably recall that I am philosophically a Libertarian (big “L”, thank you). Being inspired afresh by the recent patent dust-up and it being quite some time since I read it originally I figured a “refresher” was prudent for someone given to “spouting off” on her opinion(s).
As I set about these two “tasks”, each inspired by a specific desire to gain or refresh knowledge, I was yet again struck by the vast array of information available to anyone with a computer and an internet connection. However, after an unsuccessful attempt to search out a vaguely remembered piece on the “news consumer” and how a small percentage of users account for the vast majority of “consumption” I was also reminded that a “vast array of information” can be a detriment since it’s just easier to give up the search than sift through it all. So not every information quest has a successful outcome.
Information is a “peculiar thing”, having both a [potential] “value” if I possess it, and yet it does not diminish me in any way to share the information I possess, that is as long as I am not sharing the proprietary and confidential information of my employer that by way of their employment of me I have access, extending even to the information I compile and supply that company.
Which brings me back to one of this weekend’s central themes:
My perspectives can tend to the naive and simplistic at times. A problem exists? Fix it. A need exists? Satisfy it. A danger exists? Neutralize it. This admitted naivete no doubt underpins both my opinion on the Indonesian viral strain sharing and the use of those shared viruses. However naive those perspectives may be in fact, they are also deeply informed by experiences not shared by most, so most others would be “naive” in my eyes when viewed from a very specific vantage point.
I cannot help but quietly judge all those who go on about the [artificial] issues of property and intellectual rights [or not] of a virus that holds the potential to kill at least a certain number of people. I judge them as having never actually dealt with death and dying in its “random and unfair” nature as it visits those well before their “naturally allotted life span” whether through accident, violence, or sudden-onset disease.
We in Western nations have “sterilized” death, a result being that few experience what death is, its sights and smells, the emotional toll it exacts on those who do deal with all the “messy aspects” so that others are insulated. Flubies are few in number, and of those few there is a subset that vocally decry Indonesia’s stance on the virus that is endemic to their country, nearly every one [but not exclusively] of that subset has dealt with those “messy aspects”. Perhaps, just perhaps, there is a message in that.
Financial gain and/or dreams of such is offensive when death’s stench is easily recalled. But then the olfactory and limbic systems are somewhat interconnected, so perhaps, just perhaps, there is a message there as well.
Talk to me about the artificial concepts of “owning” a virus [H5N1] that potentially threatens those I cherish, (and by way of that “owning” those who are attempting to fix a problem, fill a need, and neutralize a threat are denied access), when the smells of death cling to your nostrils.
SZ
]]>Needless to say I had to follow the link, eye-bleeding spreadsheet begging to be completed be damned. To my great displeasure I encountered a serious piece sympathetically addressing Hammond’s [sensationalist and inaccurate] essay on the supposed uncovering of the CDC patenting Indonesian H5N1 genes, or to use Mr. Hammond’s own words, “the US Centres for Disease Control (CDC) and US National Institutes of Health claim ownership of Indonesian influenza genes.”
Before I quite knew what I was doing I had looked up the phone number for the US CDC and was ringing up Media Relations.
My simple, even if somewhat inarticulate question: Are the claims of Mr. Hammond correct? Of course I knew they were not but I wanted to hear it out right and “from the source”. Before an hour had elapsed I received an email response…
Response to Query on the recent Edward Hammond Blog, “WHO-linked centre lays patent claim on bird flu virus”
Unfortunately, this blog is not correct and offers misinformation.
The National Institutes of Health has filed for a patent; a CDC scientist is listed on this patent application.
The patent is for a prime boost vaccine strategy where you receive two vaccines; the first is a prime which contains a DNA vaccine for the HA sequence of the influenza virus only, the second is a boost vaccine with a protein. The two together are intended to offer amplified and focused protection against the influenza virus.
So the patent is, in principle, for a method of vaccination and is definitely not specific to H5.
It is definitely not a patent on a virus from Indonesia.
[my emphasis]
As Jay S. commented on the previous post:
As much as I bristle at Mr. Hammond’s misleading statements and the potential to do harm to the integrity of Flublogia and especially these fine agencies maligned in his report, I am more angered at these news media that lend platforms for these types of “drive by” reporting without due diligence on their part for accuracy thereof.
[my emphasis]
On my drive home this evening I thought about a little quip Craig Ferguson often says on The Late Late Show on CBS. ”If it’s on the internet it must be true“, said with exaggerated emphasis on the “true“. How the World Works seems to think so in this case. The truly stunning and sad thing is the essay even links the actual patent filing that Mr. Hammond is on about in his inaccurate and sensationalist essay, or “scoop”, as it is called on How the World Works, and yet the essay belies any apparent “fact checking” having been done.
Winston Churchill, paraphrasing an old adage, once said: “A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on” and that was even before the internet. Be that as it may, the age of the internet allows each of us to vet information we are served up, Craig Ferguson notwithstanding, and we who comment, even if only in our “private citizen platforms” have a certain responsibility to make sure we are not spreading falsehoods that have the potential to do real harm to real people.
Is it really so simple a thing as to self-label as an “expert” and no matter the drivel you espouse your information is not vetted? Or is it that many of us want to believe the US government, and those employed by it, are blatantly stupid, ignorant, and ignoble?
Sometimes people, even government employees, make bad decisions, after all, no one is perfect, no matter how hard we might try. When people who are in positions of authority or responsibility make a mistake, bad decision, or act in ways that are decidedly not in our best interest it’s important and a good thing that we have those who are ever watchful for them and who will alert the wider world to a “bad thing”. However, when one spreads lies about an organization and the important work they are doing for nothing more than the furtherance of a personal agenda [anti-genetic engineering] then everyone is ill-served.
To be well served:
Lies such as those spread by Mr. Hammond directly undermine all of what we do need.
[snip]
Given the magnitude of international air travel and the likely length of the asymptomatic incubation period of any new influenza virus, which would certainly exceed the time taken to fly between any two points on the earth’s surface, it is highly likely that the entry of a new virus into Australia is almost unstoppable.
Professor Peter Curson of the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney has recently highlighted the difficulties facing traditional quarantine measures in an age of mass air travel.
If, however, the first case arriving in Australia is detected and isolated in time, there is still a chance that an epidemic on our continent can be prevented.
The current H5N1 virus has been known so far to have infected at least 385 people around the world, mostly in Asia, and the death rate — despite all modern available treatment, including all the currently available vaccines and antivirals — is approximately 63 per cent.
If and when a pandemic next occurs, if the new virus retains the same pathogenicity of the current avian influenza virus, we can expect about 4 billion people to die in the world over a six-month period. And that is how long it will take for a truly protective new vaccine to be developed and produced.
And the virus will be no respecter of wealth or class or education or intellect. In fact, if it behaves like past influenza viruses, it will not spare any age group. Even physical fitness will provide little or no protection.
I have frequently bemoaned the inability of many to understand and admit, or just to understand, that a pandemic from an genetically avian A/H5N1, but adapted to enable sustained human-to-human transmission, does not have to behave as 1918’s H1N1 pandemic strain. I have bemoaned it so often that recently I created a brand new category, [Poverty of aspect], to tuck these frequent moans into.
I am going to be somewhat lazy, actually not lazy per se, but bone weary from a blisteringly stressful week at my “day job”, and point those who have not seen my brief comment on Crof’s post to two of my previous posts. They lay out some of why I believe Dr. John Graham, the Australian editorialist, might be closer to a correct assumption than those who believe 1918’s pandemic is as bad as it could possibly ever be. Please note: “Closer to correct” doesn’t mean I’m saying he IS correct, only possibly closer to the measure.
Vindication-of sorts, and Vindication-of sorts II.
No one knows what the next pandemic will offer humanity, whether it will be a relatively “non-event” such as 1968’s or whether it will be a beast beyond our current imagination, we just don’t know. Dr. Graham doesn’t know, our officials don’t know, our most renowned and well-respected virologists don’t know, and I certainly don’t know.
We can only attempt to understand the future by what we DO know, even though that is pitifully lacking. And, what we DO know at this point in time, and A/H5N1’s epidemiological profile, is that it is a DIFFERENT beast, the likes of which we have never seen before.
Interestingly, at least to me, is our collective willingness to believe, without question, assumptions based on a past event, an event that is for the most part only understood via assumptions and empirical data, over data coming out of our current labs underpinned with our greater scientific and continually evolving understanding.
If we heard about the full range of potentials for an H5N1 pandemic Dr. Graham’s editorial wouldn’t be so shocking to our sense of reality, instead, we could judge his words and opinions on what he bases them on, the science as we know it at this moment in time. That “science” says it may, just may, be possible that billions would die.
SZ
]]>Just as a Category 5 hurricane begins when winds reach 156 mph (250 km/h) that does not preclude a Cat5 storm from being stronger, or have wind gusts significantly higher, there is no scientific support for the belief that a severe pandemic cannot have a fatality ratio of greater than 2%. In point of fact, there were many places around the world that experienced significantly higher fatality ratios during the 1918 pandemic, it being the one and only example we have to look to with any degree of confidence (such as it is, confidence that is).
I titled this entry Poverty of Aspect because, as Karl Duncker coined the phrase, it refers to taking the more restrictive view as opposed to the broader on issues and problems. We see this repeatedly from many of those who make pronouncements about how the next severe influenza pandemic will behave. Assuming our one example defines the outside parameter of all that is possible.
Recently I have focused on “The Message”, the problems of communicating it, and the failure to heed; I thought I would go ahead and create a category for this phenomenon. With what I heard at the IDSA conference, and what I anticipate I will hear at September’s HHS PHEMCE workshop I figure I may be spending a goodly bit of “blogging time” continuing to focus on all things communication and perception, or at least as I see them, understand them, or wish them to be. With the slowdown in the news on the Avian Influenza PanFlu front, I’m also guessing that I will have the time to chew on this at leisure. Not only the time, but plenty of examples to trot out as well.
The first place to start is with the above stated 2% fatality rate assumption for an outside parameter.
I get the sense that when most people say that a 2% CFR (Case Fatality Ratio) is as bad as it could get they honestly believe it. Furthermore, they believe that in our modern times with all of our modern healthcare and our modern, more hygienic lifestyles, even the 2% CFR is so outside the probable as to be nearly impossible to conceive. But, because 1918 had a 2% CFR (more anecdotal assumption than hard fact) most everyone is left with no supportable alternative but: OK, maybe it could be that bad, but it’s not at all likely.
A fresh example of this hit Flublogia today [thanks kobie @ FW], this little snip from AScribe Newswire Political Boarders, Health-Care Issues Complicate Pandemic Planning:
[snip]
In addition to staffing and community coordination issues, the researchers also found that misunderstandings about projected mortality and illness rates are creating panic.
“In several counties, many planners are anticipating devastating impacts that even exceed the worst case scenarios historically,” Avery said. “The confusion results in a sense of helplessness among some planning teams because they believe any planning will be rendered useless by the magnitude of the problem.”
To counter this, the researchers suggested more explanations by federal, state, international and academic experts about statistics and surveillance. [emphasis added]
Perhaps the researchers would find it beneficial to do a tad bit of review themselves:
September 2006 WHO report:
Influenza Research at the Human and Animal Interface
[snip]
One especially important question that was discussed is whether the H5N1 virus is likely to retain its present high lethality should it acquire an ability to spread easily from person to person, and thus start a pandemic. Should the virus improve its transmissibility by acquiring, through a reassortment event, internal human genes, then the lethality of the virus would most likely be reduced. However, should the virus improve its transmissibility through adaptation as a wholly avian virus, then the present high lethality could be maintained during a pandemic.
[emphasis added]
We may not understand the why behind the lethality but that does not change the fact that it is highly lethal. And while there is no way of knowing with certainty what the properties of a pandemic strain of H5N1 would be, it is foolish, in the extreme, to ignore the possibility that a wholly avian H5N1 , though adapted to humans, could retain much, or a significant portion, of its current lethality.
The AScribe Newswire report is a providential example of Poverty of Aspect. Because 1918 was only thus and so, nothing can be worse – just ask the government and statisticians.
SZ